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Hard determinists hold that moral responsibility is incom-
patible with determinism, that determinism is true for all
human actions, and that human beings are consequently not
morally responsible for any of their actions.^ It is often
objected that, since hard determinists reject the idea of moral
responsibility, they have to reject our current practices of
punishing wrongdoers. The concepts of desert and moral
responsibility go hand in hand—one cannot deserve to be
punished for something unless one is morally responsible for
it. So if no one is morally responsible, no one deserves to be
punished, and punishment cannot be justified if it is not
deserved. This objection extends not just to punishment
inflicted upon wrongdoers by others but also to punishment
wrongdoers inflict upon themselves. Remorse is often taken to
be a kind of self-inflicted punishment, a way of imposing
emotional suffering upon oneself because one takes oneself to
deserve it. Proponents of this objection think it is absurd to
claim that we have to reject all these ways of responding to
wrongful actions, and since they think hard determinists have
to claim this, they think we should reject hard determinism.
This objection depends upon a retributive interpretation of
punishment. According to retributivism, punishment must be
justified in terms of what the agent deserves. Hard determinists
can respond to this objection by rejecting retributivism and
adopting consequentialism about punishment instead.^ According
to consequentialism, punishment must be justified in terms of
its beneficial behavioral consequences. For example, imprison-
ment has the beneficial behavioral consequences of preventing
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wrongdoers from committing more crimes, and possibly deter-
ring them from repeating their crimes after they are released
(and possibly deterring others too). The value of these conse-
quences "outweighs" the pain of the punishment. The conse-
quentialist approach to punishment appears to give hard
determinists a way to justify whatever punishments are really
needed to keep society functioning.
But remorse cannot be given an adequate consequentialist
justification. Sometimes remorse has beneficial behavioral
consequences, but sometimes it does not. The cases in which it
does not have beneficial behavioral consequences pose a
problem for hard determinism. As I will go on to argue, remorse
is connected in a privileged way with understanding that one
has done something wrong. For this reason, it is important for
hard determinism to accommodate remorse even when it does
not have beneficial behavioral consequences. This is a challenge
for hard determinism, but I will argue that it can be met if we
incorporate virtue ethics into hard determinism.^ I will
conclude by arguing that the virtue-based account of remorse to
be presented here is defensible even if we suppose that we do
have free will after all. In other words, though hard deter-
minism requires this account of remorse, this account of
remorse does not require hard determinism.
To begin, we must consider how remorse functions when it
does have beneficial behavioral consequences. First, remorse can
modify wrongdoers' behavior so that they do not repeat wrong-
ful acts in the future.'' Second, remorse can prompt wrongdoers
to behave in special ways toward the people they have wronged,
for example, by trying to make amends, and by expressing their
remorse.^
First, remorse can prevent wrongdoers from repeating
wrongful acts because experiencing suffering as a result of
acting in some particular way tends to modify agents' behavior
so that they do not act in that way again. We can see this
phenomenon in its simplest form in the way a child who feels
pain after touching a hot stove does not touch hot stoves again
afterwards.
We can think of remorse as operating in a similar way.
Remorse is a state of emotional suffering that is consciously
focused on morally relevant facts about one's wrongful actions.
Said differently, it is suffering that has those morally relevant
facts as intentional objects, such that one suffers from the
consciousness of one's wrongful actions. One cannot experience
remorse without consciously representing morally relevant facts
about one's wrongful actions as the cause of one's suffering.^
(For the moment, let us leave open the questions of what the
morally relevant facts are, which are the intentional objects of
remorse, and what the nature of the suffering involved in
remorse is.)
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Remorse's privileged connection with morally relevant facts
about one's wrongful actions makes remorse different from
other kinds of suffering wrongdoers often experience as a result
of those actions. Consider imprisonment. Prisoners can
experience the suffering of imprisonment without thinking of it
as caused by the crime that got them into prison. Prisoners
often come to think of their imprisonment as caused by the
prison guards, the police, and the courts—that is, the penal
system. And it would seem that the more prisoners think of
their imprisonment as caused by the penal system, rather than
by their crimes, the less likely imprisonment will be to keep
them from repeating their crimes. That is, if they think of
imprisonment as caused by the penal system rather than by
their crimes, they may believe that the best way to stay out of
prison is to stay away from the penal system rather than to stop
committing crimes.
The suffering of remorse cannot be psychologically dissoci-
ated in this way from the unethical action that is its original
cause. And it is natural to assume that, all things being equal,
the more clearly human beings understand the causal
relationship between something that causes suffering and the
suffering that thing causes, the more they will tend to avoid the
thing that causes suffering. For this reason, remorse might be
thought to be among the most effective kinds of suffering for
preventing wrongdoers from repeating their wrongful actions.
Now let us turn to the second way remorse can produce
beneficial behavioral consequences. Remorse can cause wrong-
doers to behave in special ways toward the people they have
wronged. Remorse can cause a wrongdoer to try to alleviate the
suffering of the people he has wronged, that is, to try to make
amends. Remorse can also cause a wrongdoer to express his
remorse to the people he has wronged. The wrongdoer thereby
communicates the fact that he is suffering from the wrong too,
and thereby bears the burden of the wrong along with them.
(This is of course merely a metaphor, but it is indispensable for
thinking about remorse.) Often, when the people wronged feel
that the wrongdoer bears the burden of the wrong along with
them, it makes their own suffering easier to bear.
At this point we can consider the kind of remorse that poses
the challenge for hard determinists, that is, remorse that does
not have beneficial behavioral consequences. Remorse some-
times has an effect on the wrongdoer's inner life but no effect
on the wrongdoer's outward behavior. Wrongdoers sometimes
feel remorse, and form intentions to mend their ways in
response to that remorse, but fail to act on those intentions.
Also, wrongdoers do not always have the opportunity to make
amends or express their remorse. But when remorse does not
have any "payoff" in beneficial behavioral consequences, there
isn't anything to "outweigh" the pain of the remorse, so a
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consequentialist justification cannot be provided. How can hard
determinists hold that it is appropriate for wrongdoers to feel
the pain of remorse if it has no beneficial behavioral con-
sequences and wrongdoers do not deserve to experience this
pain?
Hard determinists might just accept that it is not appro-
priate for wrongdoers to experience remorse if it has no
beneficial behavioral consequences. But this is unsatisfying,
because of the connection between experiencing remorse and
understanding morally relevant facts about one's wrongful
actions. Other forms of suffering that wrongdoers might
experience in response to their wrongful actions do not seem to
be linked to understanding that one has done wrong in any
special way. Wrongdoers can be made to feel physical pain and
fear, for example, without understanding why what they did
was wrong. This cognitive relationship between remorse and
morally relevant facts makes the preservation of remorse
within hard determinism of special interest. Determinism
doesn't imply that we shouldn't understand our wrongs, even if
it does imply that we do not deserve to suffer for our wrongs. So
if part of understanding that we have done something wrong is
feeling remorse, then it might be appropriate to feel remorse
when we have done something wrong, even if we do not deserve
to feel remorse.
But is it in fact true that remorse is part of understanding
that we have done something wrong? Retributivists about
remorse are likely to object here. A retributivist might argue
that understanding that one has done wrong and feeling
remorse are entirely separate. We feel remorse when we
understand that we've done wrong only because we believe that
we deserve to feel remorse when we do wrong. Retributivists
might hold that we can explain what makes wrong acts wrong
in deontological terms, as the violation of absolute moral rules.
They might then point out that, presumably, one can under-
stand that one has broken rules without experiencing remorse,
so we must provide an explanatory link between understanding
that one has done wrong and remorse. Such a link, they might
claim, can only be provided by the belief that one deserves to
suffer when one has done wrong.
If this is the right way to think about remorse, then it
appears that, when hard determinists reject desert, they break
the connection between understanding the wrong and feeling
remorse. But the retributivist's argument depends on stipu-
lating that it is sufficient for understanding that one has done
wrong to understand that one has broken moral rules. It is not
obvious that the retributivist is entitled to this stipulation. If
the hard determinist can provide a defensible alternative
account of understanding that one has done wrong, according to
which such understanding involves remorse, but not by way of
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desert, then the retributivist's argument gets no purchase. Let
us turn to this task.
The first step is to claim that in order to understand that
one has done wrong, one must understand that one has caused
the people one has wronged to suffer.' That is, the facts about
the suffering one has caused are the intentional objects of
remorse, according to the hard determinist, virtue-based
account of remorse to be advanced here. A more abstract grasp
of the fact that one has done wrong, a mere grasp of the fact
that one has broken moral rules, is not sufficient for this kind
of understanding.
The second step is to claim that virtuous wrongdoers
sympathize with the suffering of the people they have wronged.
What it is to sympathize with the wronged person, in the sense
I have in mind, is just to suffer in sympathy with the wronged
person. To return to the metaphor we used earlier, by suffering
in sympathy, the wrongdoer bears the burden of the wrong
along with the person wronged. This sympathetic suffering
explains why remorse is painful, according to the account of
remorse to be advanced here. In response to this second step,
however, retributivists will surely claim that it cannot be
appropriate to demand such sympathetic suffering if the wrong-
doer does not deserve to suffer.
This leads us to the third step, which is to point out cases
where we clearly do think sympathetic suffering is appropriate
even when it is not deserved and to argue that we can think
about remorse in terms of these cases. Sympathetic suffering is
also characteristic of love and friendship. If one's loved one or
friend is suffering, it is appropriate to suffer in sympathy. But
the reason it is appropriate has nothing to do with desert. It
would be a confusion to suppose that, by loving or befriending
someone, one had gotten oneself into a situation where one
deserved to suffer when that person was in pain. The reason we
suffer in sympathy with friends and loved ones is that we care
about them, and the sheer fact of understanding that they are
in pain gives us pain.^ We think it is virtuous to love and
befriend others, so if suffering in sympathy with friends and
loved ones is part of loving and befriending, then it seems right
to see such sympathetic suffering as partially constitutive of
these virtuous states of character.
We can think of remorse as having the same underlying
structure that suffering in sympathy with friends and loved
ones has. Sympathetic suffering for friends and loved ones often
has beneficial behavioral consequences that run parallel to the
beneficial behavioral consequences of remorse. Sympathetic
suffering prompts us to try to relieve the suffering of the friend
or loved one, much as remorse prompts wrongdoers to try to
make amends. Sympathetic suffering also prompts us to express
our sympathy, to indicate that we bear the burden of the pain
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along with our friend or loved one, thereby making the burden
of the friend or loved one easier for him to bear.
Sympathetic suffering for friends and loved ones also shares
with remorse the fact that it doesn't always have beneficial
behavioral consequences. But when it doesn't have such
consequences, we still think it is appropriate. If you were stuck
on a desert island, for example, and you knew someone you
loved was suffering, you wouldn't think you should stop
suffering in sympathy just because you couldn't help your loved
one or express your sympathy, because suffering in sympathy is
part of what it means to love the person. You could only stop
suffering in sympathy if you stopped loving the person.
The reason we never seek a consequentialist or retributivist
justification of sympathetic suffering for friends or loved ones
and we do sometimes seek such a justification for remorse, is
that we do not think of sympathetic suffering for friends and
loved ones as a kind oi punishment, and we are sometimes
mistakenly inclined to think of remorse that way. So part of the
solution to our problem about remorse is to stop thinking of it
as punishment and, instead, to think of it as just one member of
a set of emotional engagements, all of which depend upon
suffering in sympathy with others, and none of which involve
desert. Like love and friendship, remorse is a virtuous state of
character that depends upon suffering in sympathy with people
one cares about.^
It may he thought oxymoronic to speak of a virtuous state of
character of an agent who has acted unethically. To this we can
reply that, certainly, a perfectly virtuous person would be one
who had no unethical deeds to feel remorseful about. But in the
realm of the sub-ideal traversed by most of us, we must rely on
a conception of imperfect virtue.^" That is, most of us are
imperfectly governed by the virtues, so that we lapse from time
to time and behave in ways that are not virtuous. Imperfectly
virtuous agents feel remorse in the wake of serious lapses in
virtuous conduct.
The relationship established when one agent wrongs another
is of course a very different kind of relationship than what is
involved in love or friendship. But it involves a sort of intimacy
all the same. Loving, befriending, and harming all create what
we might call moral connection. In all three kinds of relation-
ship, the lives of the people involved become intertwined in
fundamental ways, and the relationships contribute to the basic
fabric of the moral identity of the people involved. The
wrongdoer's subsequent experience of remorse is a way of
recognizing and taking seriously the morally salient relation-
ship he bears to the person wronged. Such sympathetic
suffering is something we expect of wrongdoers, in much the
same way that we expect sympathetic suffering from people
whose loved ones or friends are suffering.
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Some might object that there isn't the right kind of analogy
between love and friendship, on the one hand, and remorse on
the other. When we suffer in sympathy with loved ones or
friends, we do so spontaneously, because we care about them.
But when one person wrongs another, the wrongdoer obviously
doesn't care about the person, at least not enough to avoid the
wrongful action in the first place. So, with love and friendship,
the sympathetic suffering springs from an emotional engage-
ment that is already there, on the basis of which one spontane-
ously suffers in sympathy. But when wrongdoers do not suffer
remorse, it means that there is no emotional engagement that
could be the basis for spontaneously suffering in sympathy. To
claim that remorse has the same structure as suffering in
sympathy with friends and loved ones is to seek to force
remorse into a mold it just doesn't fit.
But this objection is mistaken. Often, wrongdoers do feel
remorse just as spontaneously as people suffer in sympathy
with friends and loved ones. No one has to demand it of them.
It is true that, in many cases, the emotional engagement
between the remorseful wrongdoer and the person wronged only
forms after the wrong is done,'^ while in cases of suffering in
sympathy with friends and loved ones, the emotional engage-
ment often preexists the suffering with which we sympathize.
But this does not undermine the account presented here. The
central idea to be advanced here is that the experience of
remorse is a lot like the wrongdoer feeling friendship or love for
the person wronged in the wake of the wrongful act, and then
suffering sympathetically on the basis of an emotional engage-
ment similar to the one found in friendship and love.
Now, however, objectors will ask, what about cases where
wrongdoers do not spontaneously suffer sympathetically? It is
basic to our understanding of remorse that it is something we
expect of wrongdoers, so that when they do not feel remorse,
they are failing to do something we want them to do. Objectors
may claim that there is no parallel in love or friendship. We
suffer in sympathy with people we care about, but when we do
not care about someone, we do not have that special reason to
suffer in sympathy with him, and no one can expect us to suffer
in sympathy.
But this objection is also mistaken because there are cases
in which we expect sympathetic suffering from someone who
doesn't care about the person suffering, that is, cases in which it
would be virtuous for the person to care, and in which the
person's failure to care manifests a lack of virtue.'^ Consider
two people, call them Jones and Green. We tell Jones that if he
were virtuous, he would suffer in sympathy with Green, but he
rejects our demand by claiming not to care about Green. If
Green is Jones's significant other, or parent, or child, or mentor,
or someone with whom he has played bridge every weekend for
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years, then we can reply to Jones by saying that it would be
virtuous to care about Green, and since caring about Green
involves suffering in sympathy, it would be virtuous to suffer in
sympathy with Green, and by failing to do so, Jones manifests a
lack of virtue. The point here is that there are privileged ways
of interacting with other people that create expectations that
one care about those other people. ^ ^ And my claim is that wrong-
ing someone is among these privileged ways of interacting.
Here is another way of thinking about the same point.
Suppose one was talking with someone one didn't know well,
call him Smith. Suppose Smith mentioned that his significant
other of ten years was suffering terrible pain from an illness.
And suppose one said how sorry one was to hear about it, that
it must be a very painful time not just for Smith's significant
other, but for Smith too. And suppose Smith responded, "Why
would it be a painful time for me? I'm not the one with the
pain." One would presumably feel that Smith's failure to suffer
sympathetically made him callous, or even monstrous. What I
want to suggest is that the callousness we find in wrongdoers
who have committed, for example, serious crimes of violence
and who feel no remorse is not fundamentally different from
Smith's callousness."
Sympathetic suffering is of course not all there is to remorse.
Remorse is a unique kind of sympathetic suffering, because in
remorse we sympathize with suffering we have caused. And it is
this special feature of remorse that sometimes causes the
wrongdoer to modify his behavior so as to not repeat his
wrongful actions. But this is not a problem for our account. We
need not claim that remorse shares all its features with
sympathetic suffering for friends and loved ones, only that what
is painful about remorse can be understood as based on a
similar sort of sympathetic suffering. And remorse need be no
less effective as a behavior-modifier when it is based on
suffering in sympathy with the person wronged than it would
be if it were based on suffering retributively self-imposed. The
idea is that remorseful wrongdoers modify their behavior so as
to have less suffering to sympathize with in the future.
This last point must be underlined, because it sheds light on
another unique feature of remorse. It must be emphasized that
modifying one's behavior so as to have less suffering to sympa-
thize with in the future is vicious in all cases except those in
which one might cause the suffering oneself. It is cowardly to
avoid befriending and loving people who are suffering in order
to avoid suffering in sympathy with them.^ ^ It is only virtuous
to avoid forming relationships in order to avoid sympathetic
suffering in cases of wronging others, that is, in cases where the
suffering of the other would be caused by the very fact of
establishing the morally salient relationship with the other that
would be the foundation of one's sympathetic suffering.^ "
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Retributivists may weigh in again at this point, and object
that the emotion that remains when we exclude the concept of
desert from remorse isn't really remorse at all, because as a
matter of empirical fact, the emotion that we refer to as
remorse in contemporary society does involve the idea that one
deserves to suffer for one's wrongs. I do not think this is always
true. But suppose it is. It need not undermine this account. We
can think of hard determinist, virtue-based remorse as a kind of
remorse with most of the same features of remorse that are
experienced in contemporary society, but not all of them, that is,
not the features that depend on the concept of desert. Hard
determinist remorse would seem to preserve the most impor-
tant features of remorse as experienced in contemporary society.
It is emotional suffering involved in wrongdoers' understanding
of their wrongful acts that allows them to bear the burden of
the suffering they have caused along with the people they have
wronged, and it sometimes has beneficial behavioral conse-
quences. In a hard determinist society, the kind of remorse
defended here could play a role which is very similar to the role
played by remorse in contemporary society. Further, if remorse
based on sympathetic suffering is more virtuous than remorse
based on retributively self-imposed suffering, then the presence
of remorse based on retributively self-imposed suffering in
contemporary society would not serve as an argument against
the sympathetic suffering account, but would rather demon-
strate that contemporary society is not as virtuous as it could
be. (We will later consider arguments that point in this direc-
tion.)
Retributivists may also object that remorse normally
involves regret that one acted wrongly, and regret only makes
sense if one had free will in acting wrongly. But this is
mistaken. It is uncontroversial that regret involves a wish that
one had not acted wrongly. But it is not obvious that this wish
must be based on a belief that it was physically possible for
one's wrongful action not to have occurred, in any sense that
would conflict with hard determinism.^^ People often wish for
things that are physically impossible, without falsely believing
that those things are physically possible. For example, I may
know that it is physically impossible for me to lift a 200-pound
weight but still wish to do it. It is also important to note that
people often express regret by saying that they wish to "go back
and undo" the regretted deed. But the time travel which would
be required to fulfill this wish is presumably physically
impossible no matter how things stand with determinism, and
it would be implausible to suppose that people who express
regret in this way believe such time travel to be physically
possible. So it seems unreasonable to use the physical possi-
bility of fulfilling the wishes involved in regret as a criterion for
the adequacy of accounts of regret.
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Since we are seeking to explain remorse on the model of
suffering in sympathy with friends and loved ones, it may be
instructive to look for a parallel to regret in sympathetic
suffering for friends and loved ones. And such a parallel is
readily available: when one suffers in sympathy, one normally
wishes that the event that caused the friend or loved one to
suffer did not occur. Suppose it is a naturally occurring event, a
falling rock, for example: one wishes that the rock had not
fallen. One can coherently wish the rock had not fallen even if
one knows the rock was deterministically necessitated to fall.
On the current account, the pain accompanying regret over
striking someone without justification (for example) is not
essentially different from the pain accompanying the wish that
the rock had not fallen. We can hear "If only I had not struck
him!" in the same way that we hear "If only the rock had not
fallen!" One can of course only feel regret for one's own actions,
but there is no reason to suppose that hard determinism would
undermine the distinction between events that are one's own
actions and events that are not.
Let us proceed to a different sort of objection. According to
the account advanced here, the suffering of remorse can be
valuable even without a consequentialist justification. But
retributivists may object that this makes such suffering intrin-
sically valuable, that is, that it makes it an end in itself.
Retributivists may argue that this can only be a coherent
position if wrongdoers deserve to suffer. But a virtue-based hard
determinism must reject the claim that nonconsequentially
justified remorse is an end in itself. Remorse is a noninstru-
mental means to the end of virtue, in the sense that it is a part
of the whole of an (imperfectly) virtuous state of character of an
agent who has acted unethically. We can refer to this kind of
means as a constitutive means.
It may be objected that the means/end relation is inherently
instrumental, making it a contradiction in terms to speak of
noninstrumental means to ends. But this is a merely termin-
ological objection. The distinction could be recast as a
distinction between two kinds of instrumental means: one that
is a mere cause of the end and not part of what makes the end
valuable and another that partially constitutes the end and its
value.
When remorse is consequentially justified as a means to the
end of beneficial behavioral consequences, in the sense we have
discussed here, the end is the behavioral consequences. Remorse
is represented as a mere cause of the behavior, not part of what
makes the behavior valuable. That is, the suffering of remorse
must be "outweighed" by the value of the behavioral conse-
quences if remorse is to be consequentially justifiable: rather
than being a part of what makes the end valuable, it factors
into the consequentialist cost/benefits equation in a way that
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diminishes the overall value of the end. The virtue-based
justification of remorse without beneficial behavioral conse-
quences requires a conception of virtuous character that is not
necessarily expressed in behavior. In the virtue-based justifi-
cation, the end is the virtuous state of character, and remorse is
a means to this end in the sense that it is a part of the end, not
a mere cause of the end.
I by no means wish to rule out some sort of functional
account of behaviorally unexpressed remorse and its contri-
butions to virtuous character, for example, an account based on
the causal role of remorse in producing certain courses in the
agent's reflections and certain emotions in response to certain
thoughts. In this way we could explain remorse's function as a
constitutive means in straightforwardly causal terms, so long as
none of the effects with respect to which remorse's causal role
was defined were necessarily expressed in behavior, and so long
as we recognized remorse as partially constitutive of the overall
virtuous state of the agent's character. (Remorse can be a cause
without being a mere cause.)
Now I want to compare this account of remorse to two other
accounts of moral psychology in recent literature on moral
responsibility, one from Hilary Bok and the other from Bernard
Williams. Neither Bok nor Williams focus on remorse: Bok
defends the role of guilt in moral psychology, and Williams
defends the role of shame in moral psychology. But their
concerns overlap in important ways with those of this paper.
Remorse, guilt, and shame are all painful moral emotions, and
they have all commonly been thought to play fundamental roles
in moral psychology. And both Bok and Williams are concerned
with the relationship between moral responsibility and painful
moral emotions. Bok defends a kind of guilt that does not
involve desert or self-retribution but does involve moral
responsibility. Williams thinks we should reject moral responsi-
bility, and should therefore reject guilt, and base moral
psychology on shame instead. I will argue that remorse as it
has been explained here is a better foundation for moral
psychology than either Bok's guilt or Williams's shame.
The present paper grants a fundamental role in moral
psychology to a kind of remorse that is intrinsically other-
directed, in the sense that the pain of remorse arises from
sympathizing with others. But as we have discussed, it is
common to represent remorse as intrinsically self-directed. Self-
directed accounts standardly depict remorse as self-retribution.
Hilary Bok, however, presents an account of guilt that is self-
directed, but not retributivistic, in the context of a compati-
bilistic theory of free will.^ ^ Bok compares the experience of
guilt to the loss of a romantic love relationship. She claims that
seeing guilt this way can help one understand guilt without
supposing that we feel guilty because we believe we deserve to.
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There are two important objections to her account that must be
made from the perspective of the present paper.
First, by drawing an analogy between guilt and the pain of
losing romantic love, Bok produces an account of guilt that
makes it seem narcissistic. Bok conceives guilt as a sorrowful
consciousness of how one's wrongful act has stained one's moral
character. But it seems vain (and therefore vicious) to focus on
the stain upon one's character instead of harms done to others.
When a relationship of romantic love comes to an end, the
consequent suffering is based on one's own loss and is normally
bound up with a sense of rejection and diminished self-esteem.
The analogy Bok draws between the loss of romantic love and
guilt over one's wrongful actions implies that feeling guilty
because one has done wrong is something like falling out of love
with oneself because one has not lived up to one's moral image
of oneself. This portrays guilt as a self-focused experience
characterized by sorrow over the diminished self-image avail-
able to the wrongdoer. In psychoanalytic terms, it makes guilt a
kind of narcissistic injury. Such self-focus seems in tension with
sincere appreciation of how one has harmed others. So, if we
find it natural to account for what seems virtuous about painful
moral emotions in terms of how they draw our attention to the
harm we have done to others, we should resist counting Bok's
sort of guilt among the virtues. ^ ^
The second objection to Bok's view involves the concept of
desert, and the debate between compatibilism and hard deter-
minism. Bok draws the analogy between guilt and the pain of
losing romantic love in order to explain guilt without appealing
to the concept of desert. She holds that a wrongdoer's guilt is
appropriate not because he deserves to feel guilty but, rather,
because feeling guilt when one has done wrong is appropriate in
the same way that feeling pain upon the loss of a romantic love
relationship is appropriate. Insofar as Bok's work and this
paper both seek to provide nonretributivistic accounts of painful
moral emotions, they have a common purpose. But Bok does
this within the context of a compatibilistic account of free will.
Detaching the appropriateness of guilt from desert seems like a
dangerous course for a compatibilist, given the strong connec-
tions between the concepts of desert and moral responsibility.
That is, if we do not need the concept of desert to explain the
appropriateness of guilt, why do we need the concept of moral
responsibility as part of our theory? And if a theory does not
need the concept of moral responsibility, then isn't it really hard
determinism masquerading as compatibilism?
Now let us briefly consider Bernard Williams's moral
psychology.^ " He thinks that a greater reliance on the concept of
shame in accounts of the moral emotions can help make up for
the weaknesses he sees in the concept of moral responsibility.
His concerns about moral responsibility stem not from worries
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about determinism but from the phenomenon of "moral luck,"
and problems such as the alleged characterlessness of the moral
self in Kantian approaches to moral psychology. Williams's view
is that guilt is the central emotion of self-reproach in societies
where moral psychology is regulated by the concept of moral
responsibility and that shame is the central emotion of self-
reproach in societies that predate the influence of the concept of
moral responsibility. He seems to think that, in general,
providing a greater role for shame in moral psychology would
have a corrective effect on philosophical ethics.
From the perspective of this paper, we can agree with
Williams that the concept of moral responsibility is metaphysi-
cally problematic, and we need not object to his suspicions
about guilt. But if we can demonstrate the appropriateness of
remorse in the absence of moral responsibility, as we have
sought to do in the present paper, then it is not clear that we
would have reason to give shame an expanded role. On
Williams's account, "What arouses shame is what typically
elicits from others contempt or derision or avoidance."^^ But (to
speak bluntly) it seems reasonable to claim that sensitivity to
others' expectations that we feel remorse could be a virtue, and
it seems much less reasonable to claim that sensitivity to
others' contempt, derision, and avoidance could be a virtue. If
contemporary moral consciousness tends to be more thick-
skinned with respect to contempt, derision and avoidance than
ancient moral consciousness, this would seem to be a mark of
moral progress. One way of explaining such thick-skinnedness
might be vulnerability to others' expectations about remorse
but not to their contempt, derision, or avoidance. If we can
detach the concept of remorse from the concept of moral
responsibility, then we can reject the concept of moral respon-
sibility without needing shame to prop up the foundations of
moral psychology.
Our goal in this paper has been to accommodate remorse
within hard determinism. The virtue-based account of remorse
we have developed emphasizes a structure that is shared by
remorse on the one hand, and sympathetic suffering felt toward
friends and loved ones who are in pain, on the other. In both
cases, we suffer because we sympathize with people we care
about. Rejecting the concept of moral responsibility would give
us no reason to stop suffering in sympathy with friends and
loved ones. So if we can understand remorse in terms of the
same underlying structure, we should not suppose that rejecting
the concept of moral responsibility would give us reason to stop
feeling remorse.
To conclude, it should be noted that the account of remorse
advanced here is defensible even if we do have free will. If we
find it natural to account for what seems virtuous about painful
moral emotions in terms of how they draw our attention to the
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harm we have done to others, then an account of remorse based
on sympathetic suffering seems preferable to an account of
remorse based on suffering retributively self-imposed, no matter
how things stand with the metaphysics of free will and moral
responsibility. Said differently, if it is virtuous to feel remorse
that involves sympathetic suf"fering, then this is an argument
on behalf of such remorse, whether or not we have free will.
And if the virtue of self-retrihutive remorse is questionable,
then this is an argument against self-retributive remorse,
whether or not we have free will. So even if we suppose that
there are no metaphysical obstacles to the concepts of moral
responsibility and desert that are involved in the retributivist
account of remorse, there are ethical obstacles to the retri-
butivist account that favor the virtue-based sympathetic
suffering acocunt presented here.^ ^
Notes
Thanks to the following for helpful discussions and suggestions:
Erin Kelly, Michael Slote, Steve Davis, Anne Tarver, Candace Vogler,
Amy Kind, Chad Flanders, Michael Green, and the audiences at
Augustana College and at the Mountain-Plains Philosophy Con-
ference at Fort Hays State University, where earlier verions of this
paper were presented in 2004. I claim full credit for any remaining
errors.
' A brief explanation of hard determinism, as it will be understood
here, may be helpful. Hard determinists are incompatibilists about
moral responsibility and determinism. Incompatibilists hold that an
agent is morally responsible for an action, that is, is praiseworthy or
blameworthy for an action, only if the agent could have acted
differently than he actually acted; they hold further that if deter-
minism is true, then no agent could ever have acted differently than
he actually acted. Hard determinists hold that determinism is true,
and they conclude that agents are not morally responsible for their
actions. Three further points may also be useful.
First, hard determinists can accept that events at the quantum
level are indeterministic. They need only deny that we have reason to
believe that microphysical indeterminacy "propagates upward" to the
macrophysical level in ways that are significant for human actions.
That is, hard determinists can hold that human actions are deter-
ministic, for all intents and purposes, even if there is quantum
indeterminacy.
Second, when hard determinists deny that we are morally
responsible for our actions, they do not mean that there is no
distinction between justified and unjustified actions. They only mean
that agents are not praiseworthy or blameworthy for acting as they do.
That acting in some way would be unethical can be a reason against
acting in that way, even if one would not be blameworthy for acting in
that way. (If "ought" implies "can," then hard determinism implies that
we never fail to do anything we ought to do because according to hard
determinism, it is only possible for us to do what we actually do. This
means that if someone lies, we cannot criticize her by claiming that
she ought to have told the truth. But this does not imply that hard
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determinism cannot offer any moral criticism of her lie. Hard
determinists can point out that she was mendacious and, therefore,
vicious, without claiming that she ought to have told the truth, and
without claiming that she is blameworthy for having been menda-
cious. And the fact that lying would be vicious can be a reason
against lying, even if it is not true that one ought to tell the truth.
Also see note 12.)
Third, it can seem that, if determinism is true, it makes no
sense to deliberate about what we should do. It can seem that our
deliberations have no effect on our actions because it is inevitable
that we are going to act in a certain way, so there is no point in
worrying about what is right and wrong anyway. But that
impression is mistaken. Suppose a habitual shoplifter who is trying
to break his habit is in a store confronting two options: to shoplift a
book or to put it back on the shelf. And suppose he reasons that it
would be best to put it back, and puts it back. Even if determinism
is true, and it is therefore inevitable that he will decide to put it
back, his decision to put it back is nonetheless a part of the causal
sequence that terminates in his putting it back, just as much as his
arm moving to put it back is a part of the causal sequence. It is not
as though some other process causes him to put it back and
prevents his reasoning from having an effect. So good moral
reasoning can still be a cause of good actions and, therefore, still
has a point, even if determinism is true.
^ It is important for the account to be developed here that one can
be a consequentialist about punishment without being a conse-
quentialist about ethics as a whole. The goal in this paper is to
incorporate a circumscribed consequentialism about punishment into
an account based more broadly on virtue ethics. (For a different
approach to ethics in the absence of desert, which also gives
consequentialist thinking a role within a nonconsequentialist theory,
see Erin Kelly's "Doing Without Desert," Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 83 [2002]: 180-205.)
^ Michael Slote notes that virtue ethics would remain viable if
determinism is true. But he does not consider virtue ethics as a
foundation for remorse ("Ethics Without Free Will," Social Theory and
Practice 16, no. 3 [1990]: 369-83).
'' Behavior modification is not incompatible with hard deter-
minism. There can be patterns in behavior that persist over intervals
and then change, even if determinism is true. Changes in pattern
would be deterministically necessitated, of course, but this does not
prevent us from identifying patterns and changes in them.
^ This list is not intended to be exhaustive. The two ways
discussed here are the two that are important for the argument to be
made here, and certainly they must figure among the most important
in any analysis.
^ Two caveats: (1) For the sake of simplicity, I am discussing
remorse based on true beliefs about one's actions. Sometimes people
feel remorse on tbe basis of false beliefs—that is, tbey believe some
action of theirs was unethical but it was not, so tbe action in fact
gives tbem no reason to feel remorse. But tbis does not undermine
our claims about the privileged connection between remorse and
morally relevant facts because even erroneous remorse must be based
on what the agent takes to be morally relevant facts. (2) Though we
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think of morally relevant facts about wrong actions as reasons for
remorse as well as causes of remorse, I am emphasizing the causal
dimension because what is special about remorse as a behavior
modifier is brought out most clearly in causal terms.
' It may be objected that there are wrongs that cause no suffering.
For example, I might wrong someone by lying to him, even if it was
impossible that it could ever bring him suffering. But this is not a
problem for the present account, since it is not clear that remorse
would be demanded of me in such cases. A recognition of my flaws, and
a resolution to be honest in the future, might be sufficient. The virtue-
based account to be advanced here can identify what is problematic
about such an act of lying without appealing to its effects on the
person wronged, by identifying the act itself as mendacious. (Thanks
to Steve Davis for raising this objection.)
' Michael Slote develops a virtue ethics based on caring but does
not apply it to hard determinism or remorse {Morals from Motives
[New York: Oxford University Press, 2001]). Generally speaking, the
perspective on virtue taken in this paper fits more naturally with the
sentimentalist approach to virtue ethics found in Hume and
Hutcheson and developed in the contemporary context by Slote, than it
does with Aristotelian approaches to virtue ethics. So the account of
remorse developed here is likely to be more congenial to a senti-
mentalist approach than to an Aristotelian one.
' We need not claim that remorse is always virtuous: people
may feel deep remorse in the wake of minor wrongs, or may become
debilitated by remorse, and there is no need to recognize these
cases as virtuous. Similarly, one can suffer too much when
sympathizing with a friend or loved one, and the criteria we use for
determining when suffering is excessive would seem to be much the
same for remorse and for sympathetic suffering for friends and
loved ones. (Thanks to Steve Davis for an objection that prompted
this point.)
'" Patricia Greenspan argues that feeling guilt is not incompatible
with being virtuous. She does not make such a case for remorse, but
her argument can be easily extended to cover remorse ("Guilt and
Virtue," Journal of Philosophy 91, no. 2 [1994]: 57-70).
" This is of course not true in all cases. Sometimes we act
wrongfully toward people we already care about.
1^  To claim that a failure to care can manifest a lack of virtue need
not commit one to the claim that the uncaring agent ought to care or
that the agent in any other sense has "external reasons" to care
(though it is of course compatible with these further commitments).
This is important for the following reason: though it is often thought
that "ought" implies "can," hard determinists hold that we never can
do anything other than what we in fact do. Hard determinists can
explain the significance of a lack of virtue without appealing to
"oughts" as follows. Virtuous people want other people to be virtuous
too, so virtuous people have a reason to cause other people to be
virtuous. In cases where someone's failure to care manifests a lack of
virtue, virtuous people have a reason to cause that person to care, for
example, by describing the suffering of the other to him, or by
describing his morally salient relationship to the other, in a way that
prompts his sympathy. We need not appeal to "oughts" to make out any
of these claims. (Also see note 1.)
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'^  I am not claiming that we never have reason to care about
people with whom we do not have morally salient relationships. But
if we are thinking of caring as constituted by occurrent emotional
states having facts about particular people as intentional objects,
then it would seem to follow that even the most virtuous people
cannot care for more than a limited number of people, given the
limited time people have to care. And it seems correct to say that the
people about whom virtuous people care in a particularistic way are
those with whom they have morally salient relationships. We may
also expect virtuous people to care in a nonparticularistic way for
human beings in general, and since this sort of caring would not
have facts about individuals as intentional objects, it would not be
confined to a limited group of people. But suffering in sympathy is
normally based on particularistic caring. See Slote (ibid.) for a
discussion of the distinction between particularistic and generalized
caring.
" This account of remorse might be framed in terms of empathy
rather than (or in addition to) sympathy. I frame it in terms of
sympathy because of affinities between the perspective on virtue taken
here and Hume's account of virtue, in which sympathy occupies a
central position. Recent work on empathy which supports this
approach to remorse includes Martin Hoffman's Empathy and Moral
Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) and
Michael Slote's "Sentimentalist Virtue and Moral Judgement: Outline
of a Project" {Metaphilosophy 34, no. 1 [2003], 131-43).
^^  There are some exceptions to this claim about cowardice. One
might avoid befriending people who engage in needlessly risky
behavior in order to avoid sympathetic suffering without being a
coward. One might also avoid befriending someone in order to avoid
sympathetic suffering without being a coward if one had reason to
believe that the sympathetic suffering would be debilitating because
of limits in one's psychological strength. But even in these cases, it
seems implausible to suppose that this avoidance would be virtuous.
It would simply not be vicious. (Thanks to Anne Tarver fo this
objection.)
*^ It is also noteworthy that it is only if we explain remorse in
terms of sympathetic suffering that the pain of remorse can give one a
broadly moral, rather than merely self-interested, reason to modify
one's behavior. If an agent with a history of violent behavior knows he
will be beaten if he continues to harm others, then his desire to not be
beaten gives him a reason to modify his behavior so as to stop
harming others. But if this is the only reason that motivates him to
modify his behavior, then it seems that his motivation is not really
moral but rather merely self-interested. For his motivation to be moral
in this case, he must be at least partially motivated by a concern for
others. If we think of remorse as retributively self-imposed suffering,
then a desire to not feel remorse seems no morally better as a reason
to modify one's behavior than a desire to not be beaten. But if remorse
is based on sympathetic suffering, then a desire to not feel remorse
intrinsically involves a concern for others.
" Bernard Williams makes a point that parallels this one in some
respects.
1^  Hilary Bok, Freedom and Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1998), 167-79.
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'^  This response to Bok fits well with Hutcheson's view that it is
self-centered to concern oneself overmuch about one's own virtue, or
lack thereof (Thanks to Michael Slote for this point.)
^^  Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993).
'^ Williams, Shame and Necessity, 90.
^^  Thanks to Michael Slote for suggesting this point.
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